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LEGALESE V. PLAIN ENGLISH: AN
EMPIRICAL STUDY OF PERSUASION AND
CREDIBILITY IN APPELLATE
BRIEF WRITING*
Robert W. Benson**
and Joan B. Kessler***
I. OVERVIEW
This Article reports the first empirical research on the effectiveness
of different prose styles in appellate briefs. Appellate judges and their
research attorneys were asked to assess passages from briefs written in
traditional legal prose or "legalese." I Other judges and research attor-
neys in the same court were asked to assess the same passages rewritten
in "plain English."2 By statistically significant margins, the respondents
rated the passages in legalese to be substantively weaker and less persua-
sive than the plain English versions. Moreover, they inferred that the
* Copyright by Robert W. Benson and Joan B. Kessler, 1986.
** Professor of Law, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles, California; A.B. 1964, Columbia
College; J.D. 1968, University of California, Berkeley.
*** Law clerk, Frandzel & Share, Los Angeles, California; B.A. 1967, University of Michi-
gan; M.A. 1969, University of California, Los Angeles; Ph.D. 1973, University of Michigan;
J.D. 1986, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles. Ms. Kessler was an Associate Professor of
Speech Communication at California State University, Northridge, when this Article was ac-
cepted for publication.
This project was completed with research funds from Loyola Law School, Los Angeles.
The authors wish to thank Professor William Eadie, Chair, Department of Speech Communi-
cation, California State University, Northridge, and Professor David Mellinkoff of the Univer-
sity of California, Los Angeles, Law School, for insightful comments as this project developed.
We also wish to thank Dr. Rudolf Flesch, and Professor George R. Klare of the Department
of Psychology, Ohio University, for helpful comments on the final draft. The advice of Presid-
ing Justice Robert Feinerman and research attorney Joanne Victor was especially valuable for
the research done at the California Court of Appeal (Second District) in Los Angeles. Mr.
Noshir Contractor, a graduate student at the Annenberg School of Communication, Univer-
sity of Southern California, was very helpful in the statistical analysis of the t-test data. Fi-
nally, the authors thank all the justices and research attorneys who took part in the study
project.
1. For a definition of legalese and an analysis of its linguistic features, see Benson, The
End of Legalese: The Game is Over, 13 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 519, 522-27 (1985).
2. For the principles of plain English, see R. FLESCH, How To WRITE PLAIN ENGLISH:
A BOOK FOR LAWYERS AND CONSUMERS (1979); R. GOLDFARB & J. RAYMOND, CLEAR
UNDERSTANDINGS: A GUIDE TO LEGAL WRITING (1982); R. LANHAM, REVISING PROSE
(1979); R. WYDICK, PLAIN ENGLISH FOR LAWYERS (1985).
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attorneys who wrote in legalese possessed less professional prestige than
those who wrote in plain English.
The study thus suggests an answer to one of the questions left un-
resolved by the recent surge of research on legal language: 3 whether
there is any disadvantage for an attorney to use traditional legalese when
writing for judges. Empirical research has previously demonstrated that
persons who are not lawyers generally cannot understand jury instruc-
tions, 4 consumer contracts, 5 consent-to-surgery forms 6 or statutes.7 In
addition, readability formulas have repeatedly predicted that persons of
.average education will not be able to comprehend voters' pamphlets,8
ballot propositions,9 statutes, 10 standard contract forms, 
1 trust clauses, 12
government notices 13 or other typical legal documents for consumers.
14
Moreover, these predictions are corroborated by the recurrent failure of
such documents to communicate clearly when put into practical use.'" It
seems evident that the cause of the incomprehension is the legal language
in which the documents are written. Empirical studies have shown that
each of the principal linguistic peculiarities of legalese causes confu-
sion. 6 When the peculiarities are removed, comprehension increases.17
All of this research constitutes the backbone of an international
movement in which legislatures are requiring consumer documents to be
written in plain English,18 and in which lawyers and writing consultants
3. For a comprehensive bibliography of research on the relationships between law and
language, see J. Levi, Linguistics, Language, and Law: A Topical Bibliography (1982)(De-
partment of Linguistics, Northwestern University, Illinois).
4. Benson, supra note 1, at 540-47; see also A. ELWORK, B. SALES & J. ALFINI, MAKING
JURY INSTRUCTIONS UNDERSTANDABLE (1982); Charrow & Charrow, Making Legal Lan-
guage Understandable: A Psycholinguistic Study of Jury Instructions, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1306
(1979).
5. Davis, Protecting Consumers from Overdisclosure and Gobbledygook: An Empirical
Look at the Simplification of Consumer-Credit Contracts, 63 VA. L. REv. 841 (1977).
6. Benson, supra note 1, at 540-44.
7. Id.
8. D. Magleby, Voter Pamphlets: Understanding Why Voters Don't Read Them (Sept.
3-6, 1981) (unpublished paper prepared for delivery at the 1981 annual meeting of the Ameri-
can Political Science Association, New York City).
9. Id at 84.
10. Benson, supra note 1, at 555-56.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 532-37; see D. MELLINKOFF, THE LANGUAGE OF THE LAW 290-398 (1963).
16. AMERICAN INSTITUTE RESEARCH, GUIDELINES FOR DOCUMENT DESIGNERS (1981).
17. Benson, supra note 1, at 540-44; see also A. ELWORK, B. SALES & J. ALFINI, supra
note 4; Charrow & Charrow, supra note 4; Davis, supra note 5.
18. Benson, supra note 1, at 571-73; see also PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE, DRAFTING
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are showing others how to write clearly without sacrificing legal accu-
racy.19 It is now undeniable that lawyers run great risks if they write
consumer documents in legalese. 20  The present study concludes that
lawyers may also run great risks if they use legalese when writing docu-
ments intended only for judges.
It is perhaps not surprising that this study reinforces an extensive
body of subjective literature in which judges, legal scholars and practic-
ing attorneys have long advised brief writers to adhere to the principles
of plain English.21 The study also tends to refute the skepticism which
holds that judges may preach plain English but are persuaded by
legalese.22 Though the skepticism could be appropriate to some individ-
ual judges, the evidence presented in this study suggests that judges and
their research attorneys do in fact assess plain English briefs, and the
lawyers who write them, more favorably.
DOCUMENTS IN PLAIN LANGUAGE (1979); Winter, Legalese, Bafflegab and Plain Language
Law, 4 CANADA COMMUNITY L.J. 5 (1980); Note, A Model Plain Language Law, 33 STAN. L.
REV. 255 (1981); Plain English in the Law, 62 MICH. B.J 941 (1983); British ConsiderA Plain
Language Law, SIMPLY STATED, Oct. 1984, at 1; Advice From Australia's Plain English Ad-
viser, SIMPLY STATED, May-June, 1985, at 1; Redish, The Plain English Movement, reprinted
in THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE TODAY: PUBLIC ATTITUDES TOWARD THE ENGLISH LAN-
GUAGE (S. Greenbaum ed. in press).
19. See, e.g., AMERICAN INSTITUTE RESEARCH, supra note 16; C. FELSENFELD & A.
SIEGEL, SIMPLIFIED CONSUMER CREDIT FORMS (1978 & Supp. 1981); C. FELSENFELD & A.
SIEGEL, WRITING CONTRACTS IN PLAIN ENGLISH (1981); R. FLESCH, supra note 2; R.
GOLDFARB & J. RAYMOND, supra note 2; D. MELLINKOFF, LEGAL WRITING: SENSE & NON-
SENSE (1982); NLRB, STYLE MANUAL (1983); PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 18;
UNITED STATES OFFICE OF FEDERAL REGISTER DOCUMENT DRAFTING HANDBOOK (1980);
UNITED STATES OFFICE OF FEDERAL REGISTER, LEGAL DRAFTING STYLE MANUAL (1978);
R. WYDICK, supra note 2; Plain English in the Law, supra note 18; Cusack, The Plain English
Will Revisited, TRUSTS & ESTATES, July 1980, at 42-43.
20. Benson, supra note 1, at 571-73.
21. See, e.g., E. RE, BRIEF WRITING AND ORAL ARGUMENT (1974); M. ROMBAUER & L.
SQUIRES, LEGAL WRITING (1982); H. WEIHOFEN, LEGAL WRITING STYLE (1961); Alterman,
Plain and Accurate Style in Lawsuit Papers, 2 THOMAS COOLEY L. REV. 243 (1984); Griffith,
Effective Brief Writing, 16 FORUM 460 (1980); Ottesen, Effective Brief- Writing for California
Appellate Courts, 21 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 371 (1984). See also the following articles collected
in ADVOCACY AND THE KING'S ENGLISH (G. Rossman ed. 1960): Appleman, Tactics in Ap-
pellate Briefs 440; Chafee, The Disorderly Conduct of Words 619; Dore, Expressing the Idea-
The Essentials of Oral and Written Argument 810; Gerhart, Improving Our Legal Writing:
Maxims from the Masters 765; Rutledge, The Appellate Brief 429; Selvin, The Form and Or-
ganization of Briefs 405.
22. In an analogous field, one study suggests that such skepticism may be warranted. Re-
searchers found that a group of college English teachers gave higher grades to papers with
syntactically complex writing than to papers written simply. The researchers inferred that the
writers of simpler prose may have been perceived as naive and less intellectual than the writers
of the complex prose. Hake & Williams, Style and Its Consequences: Do as I Do, Not as I Say,
43 C. ENG. 433 (1981).
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II. HYPOTHESIS TESTED
The study of persuasion, or of why one message source is more be-
lievable or acceptable than another, has its roots in the fourth century
B.C.2 3 Aristotle used the term "ethos" to describe the speaker's good
sense or intelligence, good moral character, and good will toward the
audience.2" He said that if a speaker had a high level of ethical appeal,
the persuasive impact of the speaker's message would be heightened
"apart from the proof" used as support.25 Although researchers have
expanded Aristotle's definition of credibility,26 there is still agreement
that credibility, along with factors such as number of arguments and
message comprehensibility, affects persuasion.27
The anecdotal reports of lawyers, judges and legal scholars support
the supposition that these factors are at work in legal persuasion. 28 One
experienced trial judge sitting temporarily on the California Court of Ap-
peal wrote: "I read briefs prepared by very prominent law firms. I bang
my head against the wall, I dash my face with cold water, I parse, I
excerpt, I diagram and still the message does not come through. In addi-
tion, the structural content is most often mystifying."29
On the other hand, a California Court of Appeal justice involved in
this study discounted the weight of such factors and wrote to us when the
study was over:
That a decent writing style is appreciated by a busy jurist is
23. S. TUBBS & S. Moss, HUMAN COMMUNICATION 282 (1983).
24. R. APPLBAUM & K. ANATOL, STRATEGIES FOR PERSUASIVE COMMUNICATION 66
(1974).
25. Id.
26. Various components have been related to source credibility, including trustworthiness,
expertise, dynamism, and sociability. Id. at 67.
27. See E. BETTINGHAUS & M. CODY, PERSUASIVE COMMUNICATION (1987) for a de-
tailed discussion of recent research into what constitutes effective persuasion. Bettinghaus and
Cody explain how various factors leading to persuasion are identified by factor analysis. Id. at
84-86. This procedure of clustering various survey questions into factors will be discussed in
the Analysis section of this Article. See R. PETTY & J. CACIOPPO, ATTITUDES AND PERSUA-
SION: CLASSIC AND CONTEMPORARY APPROACHES 70, 77 (1981) for a discussion of the effect
of number of arguments, order of arguments, and message comprehensibility. One study in-
vestigated the impact on comprehension of a message heard by one group in a "reasoned
sequence of arguments," while another group heard the message with the sentences cut in half
and put.back together randomly. Although the second version was created so it appeared to
make sense, the first group of subjects was more persuaded than the second group. Eagly,
Comprehensibility of Persuasive Arguments as a Determinant of Opinion Change, 29 J. PERSON-
ALITY & SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 758 (1974).
28. See supra note 21.
29. Letter from Los Angeles Superior Court Judge Ronald E. Swearinger (temporarily
sitting on Cal. Ct. App.) to Robert W. Benson (Oct. 15, 1984) (available at Professor Benson's
office, Loyola Law School).
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self-evident. However, the suggestion that appeals are "won"
or "lost" thereby, is a conceit I am loathe to see further en-
couraged. Only its facts and its intrinsic worth should deter-
mine a cause's outcome, and I believe they usually do. An
advocate cannot produce merit, at best he merely directs the
court's attention to it, thereby sparing the judge and his staff
the need to ferret it out themselves. °
In this study we took no position on whether appeals are actually
"won" or "lost" on the basis of writing style alone. We merely hypothe-
sized, on the basis of existing empirical and experiential literature, that
writing style would influence the judicial decisionmakers' perceptions of
a brief's substantive quality and persuasiveness, as well as their percep-
tions of the attorney's professional credentials. The hypothesis was
borne out by the evidence gathered.
III. METHOD
Research Setting
Data for this study were collected during a two-week period in April
1985 by one of the researchers who was working as an extern at the
California Court of Appeal (Second District) in Los Angeles. The loca-
tion was chosen because of the researcher's access to subjects and the
willing cooperation of many justices and their staffs.
Subjects
From a potential pool of sixty-five research attorneys and twenty-
eight justices,31 thirty-three research attorneys and ten justices were se-
lected on the basis of availability and willingness to participate. Re-
search attorneys are aides employed by the justices to help them research
and analyze the cases that come to court. Among other activities, they
read the briefs submitted by the parties and prepare written evaluations
of them for the justices. Their influence in the judicial decisionmaking
30. Letter from California Court of Appeal Justice Donald N. Gates to Robert W. Benson
(June 12, 1985) (available at Professor Benson's office, Loyola Law School).
31. One justice and three research attorneys were excluded from the sample because of
their close work relationship with the researcher. The number of justices includes justices pro
tem and the number of research attorneys includes attorneys working as career attorneys, two
year appointees, and central staff attorneys. All of the subjects used in this study were regu-
larly involved in reading and evaluating briefs, writing memos regarding opinions or actually
writing opinions.
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process can be significant.32
The subjects were randomly given either "legalese" segments of two
different passages or rewritten "plain English" segments. There were
twenty-one female and twelve male research attorneys in the sample.
Legalese versions were given to nine females and six males, while plain
English versions were given to twelve females and six males. The ver-
sions were divided equally among the two female and eight male justices
in the sample.33 All subjects were given the same written instructions
34
and there were no additional oral instructions.
The researcher handed all questionnaires to the subjects and left
them alone to read the segments and fill in the answers. No time limit
was imposed. When collecting the questionnaires, the researcher told the
subjects that she would discuss the project after all questionnaires were
returned. At the conclusion of the project, many of the subjects shared
anecdotes with the researcher about having received poorly written ap-
pellate briefs in the past. Subjects were debriefed by memorandum when
the results had been tabulated and analyzed.35
Materials
Two segments from actual documents filed in court by attorneys
were used for the legalese versions.36 These were then rewritten in plain
English.
The segments were short because we feared we would be unable to
find subjects who would volunteer to spend time reading longer passages.
We have no strong reason to believe that the brevity of the segments
significantly affected the results of the study.37
32. See generally J. OAKLEY & R. THOMPSON, LAW CLERKS AND THE JUDICIAL PRO-
cEss (1980).
33. This sample was consistent with the proportion of males and females in the pool gener-
ally. At the time this study was conducted, there were 4 female and 24 male justices, while
there were 43 female and 22 male research attorneys.
34. See Appendix 1.
35. See Appendix II.
36. One segment was a portion of an actual brief previously found by the author of a law
review article and used as'a sample of poor writing. See Ottesen, supra note 21, at 377. The
other segment was taken from an actual petition for rehearing submitted within the last few
years to the California Court of Appeal. We prefer not to embarrass its author by identifying
the document further.
37. One respondent commented that the segments were so short and devoid of contextual
meaning that it was impossible to judge their authors as more persuasive or credible than
others. While this may have been the case for that respondent, that view would be reflected in
the statistical results for the group. The results as a whole demonstrate that the group did in
fact draw significantly different conclusions about the two versions of the short segments.
Another objection may be that this experiment established certain conclusions only about
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The first legalese segment, which we numbered 101, was an argu-
mentative heading or "headnote" taken from an appellate brief. It is
classical style in American brief writing to employ headnotes both to
identify the legal structure of the argument and to persuade. The seg-
ment reads as follows:
APPELLATE BRIEF
The trial court erred in giving flawed essential elements
instructions to the jury and thereby denied the defendant due
process and fundamental fairness since it is error to give the
jury, within the essential elements instructions, one statement
containing more than one essential element of the crime and
requiring of the jury simple and singular assent or denial of that
compound proposition, fully capable of disjunctive answer,
which if found pursuant to the evidence adduced would excul-
pate the defendant.
This headnote displays numerous characteristics of legalese that
have been identified in the linguistic literature:3"
9 Very long, complex sentence with many embedded clauses:
39
The entire segment, in fact, is a seventy-nine word sentence.
* Misplaced phrases:' Phrases that seem awkward and out of
place in the segment are in giving flawed essential elements instructions,
within the essential elements instructions, containing more than one essen-
tial element, requiring of the jury, fully capable of disjunctive answer, if
found pursuant to evidence adduced.
9 Wordy:41 Extra words are used to express even simple ideas.
Due process and fundamental fairness, simple and singular, fully capable
of disjunctive answer, pursuant to the evidence adduced.
* Long words:42 The author of the segment has a knack for words
of three or more syllables such as essential, elements, instructions, funda-
short segments, and it does not necessarily follow that the same conclusions can be drawn
about full-length appellate briefs. We doubt that this objection is sound, although to actually
demonstrate that it is unsound would require another study using full-length briefs. The seg-
ments used in this study were typical of the prose in full-length briefs. The most reasonable
inference is that the readers' assessments would simply be reinforced if they were given more of
the same in longer documents.
38. See Benson, supra note 1, at 522-27.
39. Id. at 524.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 523.
January 1987]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 20:301
mental, containing, requiring, singular, proposition, disjunctive, pursuant,
and exculpate.
9 Terms of art:43 Terms of art in the segment are due process, de-
fendant, and essential elements.
* Argot:' Professional slang in the segment includes erred and
fundamental fairness.
e Doublets:45 due process and fundamental fairness, simple and
singular.
" Old English:46 thereby.
" Absence of pronouns:47 Use of relative pronouns that or which,
accompanied by changes in the verb forms, would have helped clarify the
phrases statement containing, requiring of the jury, and fully capable.
* Too many ideas in each sentence: 48 There are at least thirteen
individual legal concepts embedded in the single sentence of the segment.
* Appearance of extreme precision: 49 The layering of at least thir-
teen individual concepts within a lengthy, syntactically complex sentence
gives the appearance of great precision. In reality, both concepts and
syntax are awkward and imprecise.
9 Pompous and dull tone:50 Portions of the segment recall Charles
Dickens' parodies of judicial language of the nineteenth century. Among
these is simple and singular assent or denial of that compound proposition
which if found pursuant to the evidence adduced would exculpate the
defendant.
9 Poetic devices:51 Alliteration and rhythm can be noted in
phrases like thereby denied the defendant due process and fundamental
fairness, essential element of the crime, simple and singular assent. While
poetic devices in legal language may charm linguists, as a practical mat-
ter they lend an air of strangeness and magic to the language which im-
pedes communication.
Segment 101 was rewritten in plain English by omitting most of the
legalese features listed above:
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 524.
46. Id. at 523.
47. Id. at 525.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 526.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 526-27.
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APPELLATE BRIEF
The trial judge erred by instructing the jury to affirm or
deny a single question which contained more than one essential
element of the crime. By joining all of the major elements, the
court denied the defendant his due process right to be acquitted
if found innocent of any one of the elements.
Note that the revision has two sentences of only twenty-five and
twenty-eight words. The total length of fifty-three words is thirty-three
percent shorter than the original. We kept the three terms of art. We
added "affirm," "deny" and "acquitted." Nevertheless, our version was
not quite as well received by the respondents as we had expected.52
The second legalese segment, which we numbered 103, was a para-
graph extracted from a petition for rehearing:
PETITION FOR REHEARING
Needless to say, we disagree with much that is set forth in
the Court of Appeal's Opinion herein. Nevertheless, this Peti-
tion for Rehearing is restricted to but a single aspect of the said
Opinion. This single aspect is the one which pertains to that
ratification of an act of his agent which is submitted to flow
from the facts as represented by Mr. Jones to the Superior
Court (Opinion: page 4, line 2 to page 5, line 2, page 11, line 7
to page 12, line 19). Specifically, we respectfully submit that
the Court of Appeal's views relative to the assumed non-exist-
ence of such ratification, are predicated upon a factual assump-
tion which is disclosed by the record to be incorrect. This being
so, we submit that the actual facts, revealed by the record, are
such as clearly to entitle us to prevail in respect of the ratifica-
tion theory.
A petition for rehearing is technically different from a brief but, in
52. In commenting on the draft of this paper, Dr. Rudolf Flesch has suggested a clearer
version:
The trial judge erred by instructing the jury to answer yes or no to a single
question that contained more than one essential element of the crime. By joining all
the major elements together in one question, the judge denied the defendant due
process. He had a right to be freed if the jury found him innocent of any one
element.
Letter from Rudolf Flesch to Robert W. Benson (Dec. 18, 1985) (available at Professor Ben-
son's office, Loyola Law School). This version (totalling 61 words) would have put the passage
into the "Plain English" bracket on Flesch's Readability Scale. See R. FLESCH, supra note 2.
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ways relevant to this study, it is the functional equivalent. This segment
displays numerous typical features of legalese, though not always the
same ones as segment 101.
0 Sentence length: 3 Four of the five sentences in the segment
were short, but one, at fifty-three words, was probably too long for easy
comprehension.
* Wordy: 4 The paragraph has an extraordinary number of words
which do not do much work, particularly adverbs, prepositions and rela-
tive clauses. Some of the extra words are needless to say, that is set forth,
herein, nevertheless, but a single aspect of, said, the one which pertains to
that, which is submitted, specifically, relative to the assumed, are such as
clearly to, and in respect of the.
e Misplaced phrases:5 The accumulation of prepositional phrases
in the third sentence is especially confusing: the one which pertains to
that ratification of an act of his agent which is submitted toflowfrom the
facts as represented by Mr. Jones to.
* Long words:5 6 nevertheless, restricted, ratification, submitted,
represented, specifically, respectfully, relative, non-existence, predicated,
assumption.
9 Terms of art:57 ratification, record, opinion, agent, petition for
rehearing.
* Argot:58 set forth in the Court of Appeal's Opinion, respectfully
submit, disclosed by the record, entitle us to prevail.
" Old English: 9 herein, said.
* Pompous tone:60 The one phrase respectfully submit is not suffi-
cient to overcome the pomposity of needless to say, to but a single aspect
and clearly to entitle us to prevail.
* Bizarre graphics:61 Frequent capitalization and underscoring, as
well as the cumbersome use of unneeded numerals to cite lines, give this
paragraph a distracting, if lively, visual appearance.
* Nominalizations: 62 ratification, non-existence, assumption.
53. Benson, supra note 1, at 524.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 523.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 526.
61. Id. at 527.
62. Id. at 524.
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* Passives:63 is restricted, is the one which, ratification of an act, is
submitted to flow, as represented by, are predicated upon, which is dis-
closed by the record to be, revealed by the record, are such as clearly to
entitle us to prevail.
In rewriting segment 103 in plain English, we eliminated most of the
legalese features identified above:
PETITION FOR REHEARING
Although we disagree with much of the Court of Appeal's
opinion, we limit this Petition for Rehearing to a single aspect:
The question of whether Mr. Jones ratified the act of his agent.
The Court found that he did not (Opinion, pp. 4-5, 11-12). We
respectfully submit that this finding was based upon a misread-
ing of the facts. The Court assumed facts that were clearly con-
trary to those in the trial record which pointed to ratification.
We are, therefore, entitled to a rehearing.
In this version, we cut fully forty-four percent of the words, short-
ened all sentences, simplified the graphics and made the tone straightfor-
ward and sincere. We retained the terms of art and, in an excess of
caution, even retained the argot respectfully submit. We also cautiously
retained the attorney's opening statement of disagreement "with much"
of the Court's opinion, though the statement might be construed as
counter-persuasive.
Questionnaire
The respondents were asked to fill in the following questionnaire
after reading one of the segments above:
63. Id.
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We are currently conducting a study of brief writing. We would appreciate your
response to this anonymous questionnaire.
Directions: For the following statements please circle the answer that best re-
flects your assessment of the previous passage or its author.
If you: STRONGLY AGREE - circle SA
If you: AGREE - circle A
If you are: NEUTRAL - circle N
If you: DISAGREE - circle D
If you: STRONGLY DISAGREE - circle SD
Please respond to the following items about the previous paragraph.
1. SA A N D SD I believe the lawyer used poor word choice.
2. SA A N D SD The writer is convincing.
3. SA A N D SD The writing is vague.
4. SA A N D SD The writing is concise and specific.
5. SA A N D SD I am persuaded by this excerpt.
6. SA A N D SD The writer is uncreative.
7. SA A N D SD Judging from this excerpt, I believe the writer
is an emotional person.
8. SA A N D SD The writer is a competent person.
9. SA A N D SD The writer is a well educated person.
10. SA A N D SD The writer is an unpersuasive person.
11. SA A N D SD The writer is a scholarly person.
12. SA A N D SD The writer is associated with a prestigious law
firm.
13. SA A N D SD The writer is an ineffective appellate advocate.
14. SA A N D SD The writer is a successful lawyer.
15. SA A N D SD I believe the lawyer is naive.
16. SA A N D SD The writer is a dynamic person.
17. SA A N D SD The writer is an honest person.
18. SA A N D SD The writer is the kind of person I would
believe.
19. SA A N D SD I believe the writer is a powerful person.
20. SA A N D SD This person is logical.
21. SA A N D SD The writing is easy to comprehend.
22. SA A N D SD The writing is ambiguous.
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IV. ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION
Responses to the twenty-two individual measures were compared
for the legalese versus revised passages (Table I). The agreement scale on
the original questionnaires was converted into a five-point scale; 5 repre-
sented "strongly agree" while 1 represented "strongly disagree.""
We varied the question direction (positive or negative) to prevent
subjects from circling all high or low numbers. This is a common re-
search practice used to control subjects who circle all high or low num-
bers without carefully reading each statement. In order to run statistical
tests on these data, all of the items were rephrased in the negative. For
instance, in item 21, "the writing is easy to comprehend" became "the
writing is incomprehensible" for uniformity of analysis.
Table I displays the mean or average response of all subjects to each
item. The t-test values indicate statistical differences between the legalese
segment mean and the revision mean. This statistical test determines
whether the observed differences reflect real differences or merely chance
occurrences.
65
As Table I shows, the legalese version of the appellate brief segment
was significantly more likely to be labeled unconvincing and unpersua-
sive, from a non-prestigious firm, or from an ineffective appellate
advocate. It was also more likely to be labeled unbelievable and incom-
prehensible than was the plain English version. The plain English ver-
64. See M. HENERSON, L. MORRIS & C. Frrz-GIBBON, How TO MEASURE ATTITUDES
86 (1978). This type of scale measures the intensity of an attitude. Items for this scale were
developed by the researcher using models from two studies: Eadie, Komsky & Krivonos,
Credibility and Distortion in a University Collective Bargaining Campaign, 12 J. APPLIED COM-
MUNICATION RESEARCH 103 (1984); and McCroskey, Scales for the Measurement of Ethos, 33
SPEECH MONOGRAPHS 65 (1966).
65. The hypothesis in this study predicted differences between the revised versus the con-
voluted writing. The direction of these differences was also predicted. The revised version and
its author were predicted to be perceived as more credible and persuasive. Only a hypothesis
of no difference (the null hypothesis) can be statistically tested. Once this null hypothesis is
tested, the results may be evaluated in terms of the predicted hypothesis. Data are collected to
test the null hypothesis. When differences are observed, statistical tests such as a t-test deter-
mine whether the observed differences reflect real differences or merely chance occurrences.
In the present study the probability level set as a criterion for rejection of a null hypothe-
sis was .05. This means that if the probability of chance occurrence is greater than five in one
hundred, these observed differences cannot conclusively be said to be true differences, and
therefore the null hypothesis can be rejected.
Even if the level of statistical significance is not met, this does not mean that this finding
cannot still be examined as an interesting direction to consider. On Table I some differences
went beyond the .05 level and were significant at the .01 or .001 levels, indicating even greater
credibility of results. A negative t-value indicates that the results were contrary to the direc-
tion hypothesized. For a more detailed discussion of statistical significance and the t-test, see
F. WILLIAMS, REASONING WITH STATISTICS 51-77 (1979).
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LEGALESE V PLAIN ENGLISH
sion, though much more favorably received than the legalese version,
fared poorly on questions 1, 4, and 21 relating to word choice, concise-
ness, and comprehensibility. In retrospect, as noted earlier, we could
have made it simpler.66
Table I shows even more striking differences between the legalese
and plain English versions of the petition for rehearing segment. The
legalese version was significantly more likely to be labeled poorly
worded, unconvincing, vague, not concise, unpersuasive, uncreative, un-
scholarly, from a non-prestigious firm or an ineffective appellate advo-
cate, unpowerful, incomprehensible and ambiguous.
As anticipated when the questionnaire was developed, the twenty-
two questions were grouped into five underlying variables: I. Content;
II. Persuasive Power; III. Writer's Qualifications; IV. Writer's Profes-
sional Credentials; and V. Writer's Personal Credibility. Table II dis-
plays the content of the question and question numbers which tended to
group together statistically because of similarity of subjects' responses.67
66. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
67. Factor analysis takes the variance defined by inter-correlations among measures and
groups the items to create fewer underlying hypothetical variables. For a discussion of factor
analysis, see MULTIVARIATE TECHNIQUES IN HUMAN COMMUNICATION RESEARCH (P.
Monge & . Cappella ed. 1980); H. HARMON, MODERN FACTOR ANALYSIS (1976).
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TABLE II
FACTOR GROUPING (CLUSTERS)
Factor
Label
Question
Number Content of Question
I. Content 3 Vague writing
4 Writing not concise or specific
6 Uncreative person
21 Incomprehensible writing
22 Ambiguous writing
II. Persuasive
Power 2 Not a convincing writer
10 Unpersuasive person
III. Writer's
Qualifications 8 Not a competent person
9 Not well educated person
11 Unscholarly person
20 Illogical person
IV. Writer's
Professional
Credentials 14 Unsuccessful lawyer
19 Not a powerful person
12 Not from prestigious firm
13 Ineffective appellate advocate
V. Writer's
Personal
Credibility 17 Dishonest person
18 Unbelievable person
Table III displays the results of a Cronbach's Alpha test. This test
evaluates whether question items within a cluster or factor measured the
same variable as intended.68 This table shows that only the credibility
scale (V) failed to meet this test. Even this scale met this test if the peti-
tion segments are examined separately.
The failure to meet reliability on the credibility scale may be ex-
plained by the fact that many of the subjects told the experimenter they
were hesitant to assess writer honesty (question 17) or believability (ques-
68. For a discussion of the Cronbach's Alpha test, see SPSS, INC., SPSS X USER'S GUIDE
857-965 (1984). A value of .60 is acceptable in testing the reliability of the scale. Table III
displays the results of this test.
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tion 18) on the basis of reading short passages. The fact that the appel-
late brief segments were shorter than the petition segments may have
intensified this problem.
TABLE III
RELIABILITY OF FACTORS
Factors
Petition
Appellate for
Brief Rehearing
Combined
Reliability
I. Content:
(Questions 3, 4,
6, 21, 22) 0.74* 0.76* 0.75*
II. Persuasive
Power:
(Questions 2, 5) 0.89* 0.89* 0.89*
III. Writer's
Qualifications:
(Questions 8, 9,
11, 20) 0.87* 0.84* 0.86*
IV. Writer's
Professional
Credentials:
(Questions 12, 13,
14, 19) 0.68* 0.74* 0.72*
V. Writer's
Professional
Credentials:
(Questions 17, 18) 0.38 0.63* 0.51
* Meets the desired level of reliability using the
Cronbach's Alpha test.
Regarding the clustering of items under the persuasive power factor
(II), question 2 may have been perceived as asking about whether the
writer was convincing on this particular occasion. This correlated to
question 5 which asked if the subject was persuaded by this passage.
While question 10 ("the writer is an unpersuasive person") sounds like it
should have fallen within this cluster, it did not meet the statistical test.
It is possible that the subjects had trouble reacting to this general
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LEGALESE V PLAIN ENGLISH
question about personality type, given the short length of the segments to
evaluate.
Table IV reports the t-test results of the subjects' assessment of the
content and persuasive power factors. The hypothesized differences be-
tween the original and revised segments were generally found to be statis-
tically significant.
A high mean score on content means that the writing was perceived
as poor in quality (vague, not concise, uncreative, incomprehensible and
ambiguous). There was a statistically significant difference for the peti-
tion segments. The legalese segment was perceived as being significantly
poorer in content than the revised segment. Although this comparison
for the appellate brief segments did not yield statistical significance,
grouping all the data together produced a significant difference.
A high score on the persuasive power factor (not convincing, unper-
suasive) meant the segment was not persuasive. Across all segments the
results were statistically significant. The revised segments were perceived
as considerably more persuasive than the originals.
V. CONCLUSION
It appears that lawyers run substantial risks when writing docu-
ments in traditional legalese, even when the intended audience for those
documents consists entirely of judges and their aides. Lawyers who write
in legalese are likely to have their work judged as unpersuasive and sub-
stantively weak. Perhaps even more worrisome for these lawyers person-
ally is the finding that their own professional credentials may be judged
less credible. More research in this area will assist law professors in
teaching students to write more effectively. More research in this area
should also cause practicing attorneys to take note of the importance not
only of what they write, but how they write it.
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APPENDIX I
TO: Justices and Research Attorneys
FROM: Joan Kessler, Ph.D.
RE: Study of Brief Writing
DATE: April 8, 1985
Professor Robert Benson of Loyola Law School and I would like to
administer a short anonymous questionnaire evaluating appellate brief
writing. The project would not take more than fifteen minutes of your
time.
I am currently on a leave of absence from my position as an associ-
ate professor of communication at California State University,
Northridge. I am a second-year student at Loyola Law School and I am
an Extern with Division Five this semester. I have done various studies
of jury behavior, and I have published in this area. Professor Benson is
an expert on legal writing, and has published in this area.
Thank you for your assistance.
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APPENDIX II
DEBRIEFING MEMO
TO: Justices and Research Attorneys
FROM: Professor Robert W. Benson, Loyola Law School, and
Joan B. Kessler
DATE: May 30, 1985
RE: Appellate Brief Writing Project
Thank you for your assistance in our project. We took two seg-
ments from actual appellate briefs that appeared to be written in tradi-
tional legalese. We then rewrote the segments into plain English. You
and 42 other Justices or Research Attorneys at the Court of Appeal were
shown either the original or the revised segments, and were asked to re-
act to statements about them. The results strongly indicated that the
revised segments were perceived by you as more persuasive and more
credible than the originals.
While there is considerable anecdotal evidence that courts are more
persuaded by clear, simple English than by traditional legalese, many
lawyers fear that it is risky to believe the anecdotes. The study you par-
ticipated in provides the first solid, empirical evidence that, in appellate
briefs, plain English is in fact more effective than traditional legalese. We
hope to drive this point home to the practicing bar, to law school facul-
ties, and to students.
We are in the process of submitting the article for publication and
will advise you of our progress. In the meantime, if you would like a
statistical analysis of the findings of our study, please contact Professor
Benson at Loyola.
Thanks again for your generous cooperation.
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